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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since early in the twentieth century, communication via radio waves 
has been an integral part of modern American society.  At its base, radio 
communication is the conversion of some form of communication into 
electromagnetic signals that are cast broadly across a terrain where the 
signals can be received and reconverted into the original communication.  
Radio communications are used for mass media as well as technical and 
governmental purposes, and have had a profound effect on everyday life, 
the experience of space and time, and ultimately the modern sense of 
self and society.1 
Broadcasters are able to communicate at a distance using technology 
that manipulates electromagnetic waves.  Only a finite number of 
electromagnetic waves can carry usable signals.  In effect, these scarce 
usable waves constitute an invisible slice of atmosphere that only a 
limited number of communicators can use at one time.  Part II of this 
Comment describes the current technological practices that enable 
broadcasters to communicate using the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Early in the history of radio communication in the United States, the 
government claimed dominion over the useful slice of spectrum and has 
since endeavored to administer this public property in “the public 
interest.”2  Not surprisingly, considering the pervasive presence and 
power of mass communications in modern society, analysis of the 
government’s shifting conception and practice of the public interest, 
contained in Part III of this Comment, reveals different legal theories, 
significant court battles, and political values that shift over time. 
In recent history, regulation of the airwaves in the public interest has 
been portrayed by legal scholars as a shift from government regulation 
to market regulation, which is generally viewed as the triumph of 
economic rationality.3  But the idea that the history of the public interest 
 
 1. For analyses of the transformations of modern life and personhood associated 
with the development of mass communication, see KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED 
SELF: DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE (1991); DAVID HARVEY, THE 
CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990); Douglas Kellner, Popular Culture and the 
Construction of Postmodern Identities, in MODERNITY AND IDENTITY 141 (Scott Lash & 
Jonathan Friedman eds., 1992). 
 2. See Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: 
The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1997). 
 3. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to 
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 207–10 (1982); Krasnow & Goodman, 
supra note 2, at 616, 629.  See generally THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, 
JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994) (describing the FCC’s historical 
regulation of radio licenses as infringing on First Amendment rights and advocating a 
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standard is one of progressive enlightenment that has reached its end 
misconstrues the historical and continuing political struggles. 
By the mid-1990s, government policy makers who had largely 
accepted the market regulation model over the previous two decades 
faced a new grassroots challenge.  Across the country, unlicensed, low-
power “pirate” or “micro” radio stations were proliferating.4  Generally 
broadcasting one to ten watts of power and with ranges less than three 
miles,5 most low-power stations were started by people who felt their 
interests, perspectives, and tastes were not represented by the available 
broadcast media.6  Considering the public nature of the broadcast spectrum, 
the authorities found themselves in the awkward position of shutting 
down the most local of radio stations and confiscating their broadcast 
equipment.7 
Faced with legal challenges8 and, in 1998 alone, over 13,000 inquiries 
from people and groups interested in starting low-power stations, the 
government relented, and in January 2000, completed a process creating 
a new low-power FM (LPFM) service.9  In the space of two years, the 
FCC had gone from raiding and shutting down microradio stations to 
inviting applications for low-power broadcast licenses.  Such a dramatic 
shift in policy could only come about through a reinterpretation of the 
public interest standard.  Part III of this Comment continues by analyzing 
 
private property approach). 
 4. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint ¶ 56, Free Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (No. 98 Civ. 2680), available at http://artcon.rutgers.edu/papertiger/nyfma/str/ 
lawsuit.html (last visited June 6, 2001) [hereinafter Free Speech Complaint], . 
 5. In 1978, National Public Radio successfully lobbied to clear the lower range of 
the FM broadcast band of low-power, noncommercial stations.  Since then, the FCC has 
had no provisions for licensing low-power stations, effectively banning broadcasts under 
100 watts from the American airwaves—at least legally.  See GREG RUGGIERO, 
MICRORADIO & DEMOCRACY: (LOW) POWER TO THE PEOPLE 18 (1999). 
 6. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 56; Fatima Fofana, Creating a 
Diversity of Voices: Local Expression Through a Low-Power Radio Service, 7 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 409, 415 (1999). 
 7. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 57–60. 
 8. The FCC eventually won the suits that have come to court: the agency 
prevailed on procedural grounds in United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  Constitutional issues were reached and decided in the FCC’s favor in Free 
Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999). See infra Part III.D. 
 9. The initial proposal for a low-power service was contained in the Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making, 14 F.C.C.R. 2471 (1999) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Making].  
The figure of 13,000 inquiries is contained in paragraph 11 of the Proposed Rule 
Making.  The structure of the new LPFM service was announced in a Report and Order, 
15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000) [hereinafter FCC’s Low-Power Service]. 
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the concept of the public interest that underlies the new LPFM service 
and locating this conception in the continuing history of the government 
regulation of the broadcast spectrum. 
This Comment concludes by suggesting that the “public interest” is 
and should remain a public policy question, subject to democratic 
controls through national elections.  Following that reasoning, courts 
should continue their historical practice of deferring to rationally based 
FCC conceptions as to what constitutes the public interest. 
II.  USING THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM:                                                 
THE TECHNOLOGY OF RADIO BROADCASTING 
The technology of radio broadcasting is based on the use and 
manipulation of electromagnetic radiation.10  Theories of electromagnetic 
radiation were first developed in the middle of the nineteenth century.11  
After slightly over half a century of trial and error, experimenters had 
created reliable ways to transmit and receive radiation that had been 
converted into communication signals.12  This “radio telephone” technology 
was to become the kernel for the new kind of information-based mass 
society in which we still live. 
At a basic level, radio transmission consists of converting sounds into 
radiating energy that can be reconverted into the original sounds by a 
receiver.13  A sound is a wave of vibrating atmospheric molecules bumping 
against adjacent molecules.14  A sustained sound is a series of such waves, 
one after the other, occurring at intervals or frequencies that change 
when the sound changes.15  A sound made into a microphone creates an 
electric sound signal that changes in voltage at the same rate or frequency as 
the original sound.16  This stream of changing voltages coming from the 
microphone is the electric “translation” of the changing sound waves and 
is the communication signal that will be transmitted.17 
 
 10. See Radio, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 2267 (Barbara A. Chernow & George 
A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed. 1993). 
 11. See Electromagnetic Radiation, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 10, 
at 850. 
 12. See Radio, supra note 10, at 2267; THE ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 
1513 (Richard C. Dorf ed., 2nd ed. 1997); Thomas H. White, United States Early Radio 
History, Part I, available at http://www.ipass.net/~whitetho/part1.htm (last visited Sept. 
22, 2001). 
 13. See DAVID MACAULAY, THE WAY THINGS WORK 254–55 (1988); Radio, supra 
note 10, at 2267. 
 14. See SHANE CLOUDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE 
PROPAGATION AND ANTENNAS 4 (1995). 
 15. See MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 230; JIM SINCLAIR, HOW RADIO SIGNALS 
WORK 42 (1997). 
 16. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 236, 254–55. 
 17. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 236. 
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Before transmission, the weak and highly refined sound signal must be 
“attached” to a more powerful “carrier wave.”18  A carrier wave, or 
carrier signal, is a stream of electric current generated by an oscillator.19  
Some characteristic of this streaming carrier wave is modulated in 
accordance with the sound signal’s stream of changing voltages; as the 
sound signal’s stream of voltage changes, so the carrier signal is made to 
vary.20  In this way, the sound signal is encoded into the carrier signal.21 
This combined signal—a stream of changing voltages—is then 
applied to a transmitting antenna.22  The signal causes electrons in the 
antenna to oscillate at the same varying rates as the signal.23  All jiggling 
electrons produce waves of electromagnetic radiation; in a radio 
transmitting antenna, the electrons are oscillating at the specific rates of 
the signal, and thus are producing or “propagating” electromagnetic 
waves that pulse at the same rate as the signal.24  Depending on the 
power output of the transmitter, the radio waves coming from the 
transmitting antenna travel some distance, dispersing along the way, 
until they are too weak to be received by normal radio equipment.25  
Before they dissipate, radio waves can be picked up by antennas 
attached to receivers where the sound to radiation process is reversed 
and the signal is converted to audible sound by a loudspeaker.26 
Radio signals are sent and received on carrier waves.27  Carrier waves 
are distinguished by the frequency of their waves—by how many waves 
are transmitted per second.28  In order to hear two radio signals at the 
same location, they must be on carrier waves with different frequencies.29  
 
 18. See id.; SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 21; Radio, supra note 10, 2268. 
 19. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254–55; Radio, supra note 10, at 2268. 
 20. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 7–8; Modulation, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
supra note 10, at 1800. 
 21. In an AM (amplitude modulation) radio broadcast, the power or amplitude of 
the carrier wave is modulated.  FM (frequency modulation) broadcasts modulate the 
frequency of the carrier wave.  MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254; SINCLAIR, supra note 
15, at 45–47; see Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; Modulation, supra note 20, at 1800. 
 22. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268.  “Antennas are metal or dielectric structures 
which are engineered to provide an efficient launch of electromagnetic waves into 
space.”  CLOUDE, supra note 14, at 41. 
 23. Antenna, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 10, at 114. 
 24. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254. 
 25. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 38. 
 26. Radio, supra note 10, at 2268; MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 256. 
 27. MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254. 
 28. Id.; see SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 17. 
 29. See MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 255–56. 
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If two FM stations are transmitted at the same carrier frequency they will 
interfere with each other and only one will be receivable at a given 
moment; generally the more powerful signal will capture the receiver.30  
In order to avoid interference, each radio signal needs a “definite width 
of spectrum” (a unique cluster of frequencies), called “occupied bandwidth” 
or “channel spacing,” that no other station in the area will use.31  Thus, 
“[t]he radio spectrum is a limited resource. . . .  [T]here are only so many 
[frequencies] of [electromagnetic] spectrum space in existence that can 
be effectively used in a given region at a given time.”32  The limited 
spectrum space means that a limited number of radio signals can be 
received and a limited number of “voices” can be heard in a particular 
place. 
Like all communication, radio broadcasting is a joint activity, 
requiring sender and receiver to use the proper equipment and be tuned 
to a particular frequency.33  It is also an inherently public activity; once a 
signal is transmitted at a particular frequency, any unobstructed receiver 
within range that is tuned to that frequency will pick up the 
transmission.34  A broadcaster can mask or distort a signal, but whatever 
signal she transmits is out there for any receiver within range to pick up.  
The inherently public nature of radio broadcasting is manifest in another 
characteristic: as energy or radiation, electromagnetic waves pass 
through air, trees, frame buildings, and even human bodies;35 by their 
nature, radio transmissions physically occupy atmosphere, public space, 
and private space.  In a sense, radio broadcasters create their own monsoon 
of electromagnetic waves in which everyone within range lives.  Thus, 
the equipment to transmit radio signals can be owned, but the spaces 
through which the signals travel cannot.36 
The inherently limited and public nature of radio broadcasting has 
become a central issue in how broadcasting is organized as a social practice.  
The remainder of this Comment will explore and compare three conceptual 
 
 30. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 48. 
 31. Id. at 18; see MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 254–56. 
 32. STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547–48 
(1999).  New technologies may be able to create and receive finer-frequency 
discriminations, which would make more signals usable, but with any technology, the 
number of useful frequencies will be finite. 
 33. See, e.g., MACAULAY, supra note 13, at 230–31, 256. 
 34. SINCLAIR, supra note 15, at 132. 
 35. See GIBILISCO, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
 36. Some writers have suggested that the right to broadcast at a particular 
frequency be subject to property ownership principles.  See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The 
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14 (1959); Brian C. Fritts, 
Note, Private Property, Economic Efficiency, and Spectrum Policy in the Wake of the C 
Block Auction, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 849, 852 (1999).  This idea will be discussed infra 
Part III.C. 
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schemes designed to organize broadcasting in accord with its public 
nature and in the “public interest.” 
III.  GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION OF THE                        
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM 
A.  Radio and the Idea of Government Regulation 
Before the government could establish a regulatory regime for the 
electromagnetic spectrum, a new idea had to emerge: the idea that the 
spectrum could and should be controlled. 
The earliest radio broadcasts consisted of experimenters sending series 
of short and long tones comprising Morse code messages.37  Originally, 
military planners and large corporations adopted radio pioneer Guglielmo 
Marconi’s vision that radio signals would be used as point-to-point 
communications that could be used to coordinate far flung activities, 
such as navigation at sea.38  The fact that signals tended to spread from 
the direct line between a control center and the recipient was seen as a 
flaw in the technology that corporate engineers tried to eliminate.39  The 
potential for “broadcasting” was initially realized by the many amateur 
radio experimenters who proliferated in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.40  The growing numbers of amateurs sending signals caused concern 
among military and corporate planners who viewed the situation as one 
of “chaos” in which the potential usefulness of the new technology 
would be drowned out in millions of individual, more or less purposeless 
voices.41 
In the wake of the sinking of the Titanic, for example, the military 
claimed rescue efforts had been hampered by the interference of radio 
amateurs.42  A sudden concern with public safety at sea led to regulation 
by Congress in the Radio Act of 1912.43  Scholar Thomas Streeter points 
out that while the 1912 Act is “[o]ften treated as a mere footnote in the 
 
 37. See White, supra note 12. 
 38. THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF 
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 59–60, 68–74 (1996). 
 39. Id. at 61, 71. 
 40. Id. at 61, 64–65.  The word “broadcasting” was originally an agricultural term 
for a manner of planting seed in which the seeds (like today’s radio signals) were spread 
or cast broadly.  Broadcast, in THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 118–19 
(Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988). 
 41. STREETER, supra note 38, at 74. 
 42. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 43. STREETER, supra note 38, at 77. 
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history of spectrum regulation, . . . [the Act] asserted several basic 
principles upon which U.S. regulation of the spectrum has been based 
ever since.”44  First, the Act “clearly asserted the principle of legally 
sanctioned limitations on spectrum access,” legislating which parts of 
the spectrum would be used for what purposes.45  The most useful 
portions of the spectrum were limited to and divided between the Navy 
and commercial operators, like the Marconi Company, which conducted 
radio communications for ships at sea.46  Second, use of the spectrum to 
transmit signals was characterized “more as a privilege than a right.”47  
Notably, the privilege was to be enforced by federal agencies, which, in 
the name of the public good, would issue licenses to broadcast radio 
signals.48 
Within these arrangements, however, little regulatory power was provided 
by the Act.  The Secretary of Commerce was given the duty of issuing 
broadcast licenses and assigning the frequencies at which licensees would 
operate, but there was no authority to deny applications.49  After 1920, 
when businesses, churches, and community groups began to realize the 
communicative powers of broadcasting to audiences at regular times on 
a regular frequency, the growing numbers of broadcasters reprised the 
era of chaotic interference.50  This time, the concern was not for ship 
safety, but that too many conflicting signals would render the broadcast 
spectrum virtually useless.51  Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover’s 
attempts to regulate the growing “chaos” of interfering and floating 
stations by enforcing assigned frequencies and scheduling different 
licensees’ broadcasts at different times were ruled by federal courts to be 
beyond the legislative mandate of the 1912 Act.52 
 
 44. Id. at 78. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  Amateurs were limited to shortwave frequencies, which were thought to be 
of little practical value.  See also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 6. 
 47. STREETER, supra note 38, at 78. 
 48. Id.  Fifty years later, this decision would come under attack by academics who 
advocated a property rights approach to spectrum allocation, but at the time there was 
little support for such an idea.  See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 15.  The 
property rights approach is discussed infra Part III.C.1. 
 49. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 608. 
 50. Id.; KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 51. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 12. 
 52. See id. at 9, 11–12; see also Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 609 & nn. 
15–16.  The cases in which Hoover’s power to regulate broadcast licenses under the 
1912 Act was construed narrowly were Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. 
Cir. 1923) (affirming Commerce Secretary’s power to assign frequencies to and set the 
hours of use by license holders, but denying discretionary power to deny applications for 
licenses), writ of error dismissed as moot, 266 U.S. 636 (1924), and United States v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (holding that the Commerce 
Secretary’s only power was to select the frequencies that licensees as a class could use; 
he had no authority to place restrictions on uses of the license). 
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In response to the threat of interference and the inability of the 
Secretary to control it, Hoover organized a series of annual Radio 
Conferences (1922–1925) in which the major players in broadcasting 
came together to discuss problems and propose a new framework.53  
Thomas Streeter points out that, “Hoover’s decision to organize the 
conferences simply reflected the principle articulated by Woodrow 
Wilson several years before: ‘the truth [is] that, in the new order, 
government and business must be associated.’”54  At the end of the first 
Radio Conference, the conferees unanimously resolved that “it is the 
sense of the Conference that Radio Communication is a public utility 
and as such should be regulated and controlled by the Federal Government 
in the public interest.”55  This conception was balanced in the legislative 
proposal of the final Radio Conference, which suggested “[t]hat in order 
to insure [sic] financial stability to radio enterprises, capital now 
invested must receive reasonable protection.”56  This balancing bolsters 
Streeter’s assertion that: 
In suggesting [that] the public good should be the dominant criteria [sic] in 
broadcasting, the conferences were not trying to remove it from private 
influence.  The public interest was part of a legal and rhetorical strategy for 
organizing broadcasting’s further development as a commercial, for-profit 
institution.  The “public interest” was not thought of as in opposition to 
commercial organization.  Rather, it was a criterion for use by knowledgeable 
experts to help make complicated decisions in the process of serving the larger 
business system.57 
B.   Spectrum Scarcity and the Public Interest 
Eventually, with the commercial spectrum jammed with over 700 
stations that changed frequencies and increased broadcasting power at 
will, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.58  The Act implemented 
 
 53. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9; STREETER, supra note 38, at 88. 
 54. STREETER, supra note 38, at 88. 
 55. To Amend the Radio Act of 1912: Hearings on H.R. 11964 Before the House 
Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 67th Cong. 32 (1923), quoted in 
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 56. Radio Control: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1764 Before the Senate Comm. on 
Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong. 42 (1926), quoted in STREETER, supra note 38, at 89.  
Streeter suggests that “[t]he aura of mysterious technical complexity that surrounded 
radio technology in the 1920s” played a role in tempering “potential discord concerning 
government intervention and corporate favoritism.”  Id. at 92. 
 57. Id. at 93–94. 
 58. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). 
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many of the ideas of the Radio Conferences, including federal regulation 
of the broadcast spectrum in the “public interest.”59  Responding to the 
chaos of interfering signals created by the 1912 Act, the 1927 Act 
legislated the federal government’s right to restrict access to the 
spectrum.  Licenses to broadcast were free, but recipients were required 
to render public service in exchange for the privilege.60  Another aspect 
of the 1927 Act that would only later become controversial was the 
declaration that there would be no private ownership of the spectrum, 
only a temporary grant of privilege (originally three years) to use the 
resource now deemed public.61 
1.  The FCC and the Electromagnetic Spectrum 
The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 instituted a 
regime of public ownership of the airwaves, with the government 
granting temporary broadcasting privileges to operators who agreed to 
operate in the public interest.62  The Federal Radio Commission (FRC) was 
created by the Radio Act of 1927; in 1934 the Communications Act 
replaced the FRC with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).63  
The FCC was given a broader administrative scope than its predecessor 
agency, but in terms of radio regulation, the FCC took over the regulatory 
regime of the FRC.64 
The FCC is the federal agency responsible for executing federal 
communication policies mandated by Congress.65  As with other federal 
agencies, Congress’s mandate to the FCC66 is generally broad, and calls 
for the agency to develop more specific policies and rules within that 
mandate.67 
With regard to the electromagnetic spectrum, the FCC has a three-
 
 59. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 13. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. See id. at 12–13; Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 610. 
 63. See Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for 
Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1687, 1692 & 
n.17 (1997). 
 64. FREDERICK J. DAY & HUONG N. TRAN, REGULATION OF WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 25 (1997). 
 65. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see DAY & TRAN, supra note 64, at 
25. 
 66. The FCC’s mandate is inscribed in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–613 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1999). 
 67. The Communications Act gave the FCC “not niggardly but expansive powers.”  
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).  The 
FCC was created and received its grant of executive power in 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & 
Supp. IV 1999).  The agency’s public interest mandates are contained in 47 U.S.C. §§ 
303, 307, 309. 
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level responsibility.68  The first, is spectrum allocation—deciding which 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum will be used for which particular 
uses.69  Thus, a certain range of spectrum is used for AM radio, another 
range for FM, another for shortwave, and so on.70  Throughout the 
history of government regulation, most usable portions of the spectrum 
have been allocated to government, military, and space communications.71  
After spectrum allocation, the FCC must perform the task of band 
allotment—determining how many broadcast channels will be denoted 
within each portion of spectrum, and exactly where those channels will 
be.72  Finally, the FCC engages in channel assignment—deciding which 
applicants will be allowed to use which channels and issuing the 
appropriate license.73  In general, the FCC’s mandate to regulate the 
electromagnetic spectrum consists of allocating spectrum, allotting 
bands, and licensing broadcasters’ uses of particular channels as the 
public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.74 
2.  The Public Interest Is Not Personal Interest:                                           
The Case of the Goat Gland Doctor, 1930 
In 1930, Dr. John R. Brinkley, of Milford, Kansas, was the owner of, 
and a regular on-air personality on, the most popular radio station in the 
United States.75  A year later, an attorney for Brinkley was appearing 
before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals trying to get back the Doctor’s 
broadcast license for radio station KFKB.76  The previous year, the FRC 
had denied Brinkley’s application for license renewal on the grounds 
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would not be served 
if Brinkley was allowed to continue broadcasting.77  This was one of the 
earliest decisions rendered by the FRC that used the agency’s 
congressional mandate to regulate broadcasting “in the public interest” 
to deny a licensee’s right to continue operating based on the licensee’s 
 
 68. JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 398 (2d ed. 1997). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 399. 
 74. See DAY & TRAN, supra note 64, at 25. 
 75. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 26. 
 76. Id. at 27. 
 77. KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 671 (D.C. Cir. 
1931). 




What had Dr. Brinkley done to call forth the wrath of executive 
administrative power?  Brinkley came to prominence as the “goat gland 
doctor,” a semiquack who sought “to rejuvenate the male sex drive by 
implanting the gonads of a young Ozark goat in the patient’s scrotum.”79  
Later, Brinkley developed a catalogue of medical remedies, known to 
the public only by their numerical designations, which he prescribed for 
a variety of ailments.80  Brinkley operated the Brinkley Hospital in 
Milford, the Brinkley Pharmaceutical Association, and KFKB “in a 
common interest.”81  The hospital paid KFKB $5000 to $7000 per month 
for on-air advertising;82 the druggists in the Association paid an 
advertising fee to KFKB for every sale of Brinkley’s concoctions.83  
Brinkley’s daily “Medical Question Box” shows on KFKB, during 
which he read and answered letters from listeners describing their 
ailments, were the primary sales tool for the concoctions.84  The District 
Court noted that in one 1930 broadcast of “Medical Question Box,” 
“presumably representative of all, [Brinkley] prescribed for forty-four 
different patients and in all, save ten, he advised the procurement of 
from one to four of his own prescriptions.”85 
The FRC, apparently alerted by “organized medicine,”86 found this all 
too much to take.  In denying Brinkley’s application for renewal of his 
broadcast license, the FRC found that: 
[T]he testimony in this case shows conclusively that the operation of Station 
KFKB is conducted only in the personal interest of Dr. John R. Brinkley.  While 
it is to be expected that a licensee of a radio broadcasting station will receive 
some remuneration for serving the public with radio programs, at the same time 
the interest of the listening public is paramount, and may not be subordinated to 
the interests of the station licensee.87 
Thus, despite the popularity of KFKB,88 the FRC held that a person 
could not operate a broadcast radio station primarily as an adjunct to 
 
 78. See Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 613. 
 79. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 26. 
 80. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 671. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 27. 
 87. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 671 (quoting the FRC’s “Facts and Grounds for Decision” 
issued in the Brinkley hearing). 
 88. The relative popularity of KFKB was due in significant part to its extensive 
broadcast range, spreading the Brinkley mix of fundamentalist theology and medical 
information from the Rockies to the Mississippi River.  KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra 
note 3, at 26. 
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some business enterprise.  Using the valuable and scarce electromagnetic 
spectrum in such a self-interested manner was outside the public interest, 
and Dr. Brinkley was forced to get off the air.89 
3.  Maximum Power Is Not in the Public Interest:                                       
The Gary-Chicago Conflict, 1933 
As commercial broadcasting became more widespread and profitable 
during the 1930s and 1940s, the FRC-FCC’s regulatory regime, with 
specific regulations based ultimately on a less than fully explicit concept 
of the public interest, was tested in the federal courts.  Big commercial 
broadcasters, who pleaded for public interest based regulation to 
mitigate the spectrum “chaos” of the 1920s,90 and then came to dominate 
the best portions of the spectrum allocated for public uses under the 
regulations,91 began to challenge FCC regulations in the courts. 
In one early case, two Chicago stations challenged an FRC ruling that 
terminated their license in order to allow a Gary, Indiana, station to 
operate with less interference.92  The FRC found that WJKS in Gary 
rendered excellent public service including broadcasts aimed at the 
many foreign ethnic groups populating Gary.93  WJKS broadcast diverse 
programs for the Gary area’s “Hungarian, Italian, Mexican, Spanish, 
German, Russian, Polish, Croatian, Lithuanian, Scotch and Irish people.”94  
The programs were “musical, educational and instructive in their nature 
and stress[ed] loyalty to the community and the Nation.”95  WJKS also 
regularly broadcast children’s programming in cooperation with local 
schools and made time available to the local police, fraternal organizations, 
and area religious organizations, all free of charge.96  The time-sharing 
Chicago stations, operating at the same frequency as WJKS, were WIBO 
and WPCC.97  WIBO played “a large number of chain programs originating 
in the National Broadcasting network[,] . . . almost entirely commercial 
 
 89. KFKB, 47 F.2d at 672; see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 27. 
 90. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is the “Public Interest”  in the Public Interest?: The 
Broadcast License Bargain of 1927, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: HAVE 
REGULATORS DIALED THE WRONG NUMBER? 49, 49–50 (Donald L. Alexander ed., 1997). 
 91. See STREETER, supra note 38, at 98. 
 92. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. (Station WIBO), 
289 U.S. 266, 269 (1933) [hereinafter Nelson Bros. II]. 
 93. Id. at 270–71. 
 94. Id. at 271 (quoting the FRC’s finding of facts). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 269, 272. 
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in their nature,” and simultaneously available on “many other stations 
located in the Chicago district.”98  WPCC was owned by the North Shore 
Church and, like many other Chicago area stations, broadcast religious 
programming and church information, mostly on Sundays.99 
The FRC found that WJKS was subject to objectionable interference 
from the Chicago stations, while “[t]he deletion of Stations WIBO and 
WPCC would not deprive the persons within the service area of those 
stations of any type of programs not now received from other stations.”100  
Furthermore, the FRC reasoned, allowing WJKS to increase its power 
and deleting the Chicago stations: 
[w]ould work a more equitable distribution of broadcasting facilities within the 
Fourth Zone, in that there would be an increase in the radio broadcasting 
facilities of Indiana which is now assigned less than its share of such facilities 
and a decrease in the radio broadcasting facilities of Illinois which is now 
assigned more than its share of such facilities.101 
The FRC specifically stated that these actions would serve the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity.102  The terminated radio stations 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which 
reversed the FRC’s order, holding that the Commission’s decision was 
“arbitrary and capricious,” and that the appellant Chicago stations were 
“‘serving public interest, convenience, and necessity’ certainly to as 
great an extent as [WJKS].”103 
The Supreme Court then granted the FRC’s writ of certiorari.104  First, 
the Court recognized its own legal jurisdiction to inquire into the facts 
used by the Commission to determine whether it had acted within the 
limits of its authority.105  Next, the Court acknowledged the power of 
Congress to regulate broadcasting under its interstate commerce power, 
stating that “[n]o state lines divide the radio waves, and national regulation 
is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio 
facilities.”106  Congress delegated its regulatory authority to the FRC, 
which was mandated to license use of the spectrum in the public interest, 
 
 98. Id. at 272. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 271, 273. 
 101. Id. at 273. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. (Station WIBO) v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 
62 F.2d 854, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (quoting the Chief Examiner’s findings from the FRC 
hearing on the application). 
 104. Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 269. 
 105. Id. at 277–78. 
 106. Id. at 279.  The courts agreed with the government’s view that since purely 
local, intrastate stations can interfere with interstate broadcasts, regulation of all stations 
is justified.  See ZELEZNY, supra note 68, at 398. 
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convenience, or necessity.107 
As noted above, in the dispute between WIBO-WPCC and WJKS, the 
public interest determination encompassed an analysis of the equitable 
distribution of stations within a geographical area, as well as the kinds of 
programming available for people in the specific, affected 
communities.108  Generally, as many communities as possible should be 
served in as particular ways as practicable.109  The Gary station, which 
broadcast diverse community programming aimed at a wide section of 
the population, was being obstructed by the Chicago stations, which 
largely broadcast programming available on other area stations.110  The 
FRC accordingly found that the public interest would be served by 
terminating the Chicago stations’ licenses and allowing more power to 
the Gary station.111  In analyzing the FRC’s decision, the Court wrote 
that the public interest criterion: 
is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer 
unlimited power . . . [but] is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of 
radio transmission and reception, by the scope, character, and quality of 
services, and, where an equitable adjustment between States is in view, by the 
relative advantages in service which will be enjoyed by the public through the 
distribution of facilities.112 
In applying this criteria to the Nelson Bros. case, the Court wrote that 
the Commission: 
was entitled [but not required?] to consider the advantages enjoyed by the 
people of Illinois under the assignments to that State, the services rendered by 
the respective stations, the reasonable demands of the people of Indiana, and the 
special requirements of radio service at Gary.  The Commission’s findings show 
that all these matters were considered. . . .  We are of the opinion that the 
Commission’s findings of fact . . . support its decision, and an examination of 
the record leaves no room for doubt that these findings rest upon substantial 
evidence.113 
So long as the FRC really does examine factors that are involved in 
determining the public interest (in this case, the distribution of stations 
and the populations served by those stations’ programming) and makes 
reasonable findings of fact based thereon, the courts are not free to 
 
 107. Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 279. 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01. 
 109. Nelson Bros. II, 289 U.S. at 279–80. 
 110. Id. at 271–72. 
 111. Id. at 272–73. 
 112. Id. at 285. 
 113. Id. at 285–86. 
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second guess and proffer their own interpretations of how the public 
interest should be defined in particular cases—that would be a judicial 
infringement of executive authority. 
4.   The Networks’ Interest Is Not the Public Interest:                                  
NBC v. U.S., 1943 
A broader challenge to federal authority to regulate broadcast licenses 
under the public interest standard came before the Supreme Court in the 
1943 case, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, in which national 
networks challenged the “chain broadcasting” rules crafted by the 
FCC.114 
In 1941 the FCC completed a three-year investigatory process by 
promulgating rules that restricted the power of national networks of 
radio stations engaged in what was then called “chain broadcasting.”115  
At the time, the three national networks, NBC (which operated two 
separate networks, the Red and the Blue), CBS, and the Mutual 
Broadcasting System were affiliated with 341 of the 660 commercial 
stations in the United States and controlled more than ninety-seven 
percent of the valuable night-time broadcasting power in the country.116  
The FCC’s Report on Chain Broadcasting did not criticize centralization 
of stations per se, and recognized benefits of chain broadcasting, but 
nevertheless concluded that the contracts the networks were requiring 
their local affiliates to sign infringed, at least potentially, on the local 
stations’ abilities to serve the public interest as their licenses required.117 
The eight regulations proffered by the FCC were quite specific and 
somewhat startling to a reader in the year 2001.118  For instance, the 
Commission considered the fact that networks were requiring affiliates 
to agree not to air programming from other networks.119  The Commission 
found that “[a] licensee station does not operate in the public interest 
when it enters into exclusive arrangements which prevent it from giving 
the public the best service of which it is capable,”120 and promulgated a 
regulation which read: “No license shall be granted to a standard 
broadcast station having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, 
express or implied, with a network organization under which the station 
is prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcasting the 
 
 114. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) [hereinafter NBC]. 
 115. Id. at 195. 
 116. Id. at 197–98. 
 117. Id. at 198. 
 118. Id. at 198–209 (describing each regulation). 
 119. Id. at 198–99. 
 120. Id. at 199 (quoting FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 52, 57 (1941)). 
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programs of any other network organization.”121  In approving this rule, 
the FCC decided that since licensees were granted the privilege of a spot 
on the spectrum in return for operating in the public interest, contractual 
relations that could hinder the ability of stations to respond to the public 
interest could be restricted.122  The FCC used the same rationale to curtail 
the networks’ affiliate agreements with regard to territorial exclusivity,123 
terms of affiliation binding for five years,124 and the right to reject network 
programming.125  These restrictions were not placed on the networks 
themselves, but on the affiliates—the recipients of licenses from the FCC.126  
Thus, the Rules on Chain Broadcasting expressed the Commission’s policy 
determination that a broadcast licensee who was willing to enter into 
contracts that could restrict his ability to respond to the needs and 
interests of his local community (the public interest) was not deserving 
of the privilege of spectrum space.127 
The networks went to court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the FCC 
regulations.128  After the District Court granted the government’s motion 
for summary judgment,129 the Supreme Court agreed to review the 
decision.130  The networks put forth several arguments that “called upon 
[the Court] to determine whether Congress has authorized the Commission 
to exercise the power asserted by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations, 
and if it has, whether the Constitution forbids the exercise of such 
authority.”131 
After describing the challenged Chain Broadcasting Regulations, the 
decision, written by Justice Frankfurter, reviewed the history of 
governmental regulation of radio broadcasting.132  The Court analyzed 
the years leading up to the Radio Act of 1927 as a developing chaos of 
too many radio stations doing whatever they wanted: “These new 
 
 121. NBC, 319 U.S. at 200 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1941)). 
 122. Id. at 209. 
 123. Id. at 200 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1941)). 
 124. Id. at 201 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1941)). 
 125. Id. at 204 (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 3.105 (1941)). 
 126. Id. at 196. 
 127. See id. at 196–209. 
 128. Id. at 193. 
 129. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding 
that the question of the FCC’s authority to issue Chain Broadcasting Rules was a matter 
of law rather than fact, and that the basis of the rules on the FCC’s findings was neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, and thus those findings were binding on the court). 
 130. NBC, 319 U.S. at 193. 
 131. Id. at 209–10. 
 132. Id. at 209–14. 
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stations used any frequencies they desired, regardless of the interference 
thereby caused to others.  Existing stations changed to other frequencies 
and increased their power and hours of operation at will.  The result was 
confusion and chaos.  With everybody on the air, nobody could be 
heard.”133  The chaos was a natural consequence of “certain basic facts 
about radio as a means of communication[;] . . . the radio spectrum simply 
is not large enough to accommodate everybody.”134  This chaos, and the 
hope of development, led Congress to pass the Radio Act.135  The 
Court’s historical analysis concluded that federal regulation of radio 
broadcasting was “essential.”136 
Congress delegated its power to a federal agency (first the FRC, then 
the FCC) that was under a general mandate to regulate the broadcast 
spectrum in the public interest so as to “secure the maximum benefits of 
radio to all the people of the United States.”137  The Commission had the 
power to define the nature of the service to be rendered by licensed 
stations,138 and make the legal regulations necessary to prevent interference 
between stations and to carry out the provisions of the Communications 
Act.139  Thus, the Commission’s power included, but was not limited to, 
technical considerations: “the Act does not restrict the Commission 
merely to supervision of the traffic [on the spectrum, but] puts upon the 
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.”140  
So long as the government could make a cogent argument that a decision 
or regulation was reasonably calculated to advance the public interest, 
the ruling was entitled to a presumption of validity.  Crucially, such 
rulings had to include denying the right to broadcast to some people; 
limiting the number of stations is how chaos would be avoided.141  So 
long as these choices were based on which licensees would best serve 
the public interest, the FCC would be operating within its delegated 
power.   
Furthermore, the Court denied that it had the authority to evaluate the 
Commission’s decisions based on the Court’s own conception of the 
public interest: 
Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based 
upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority 
granted by Congress.  It is not for us to say that the “public interest” will be 
 
 133. Id. at 212. 
 134. Id. at 213. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 217. 
 138. 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1994). 
 139. Id. § 303(f) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). 
 140. NBC, 319 U.S. at 215–16. 
 141. Id. 
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furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations.  The responsibility 
belongs to the Congress for the grant of valid legislative authority and to the 
Commission for its exercise.142 
In determining whether the Commission’s regulations fit these criteria, 
the Court reviewed each regulation, extensively quoting both the 
findings regarding network practices and the public interest rationales 
for each.143  The Court concluded that these regulations were intended to 
advance the public interest, and were thus within the mandate of the 
Communications Act.144  Finally, the Court held that since the FCC has 
to regulate broadcasting by granting a limited number of licenses, 
requiring some people to be shut out, the denial of a license based on a 
valid exercise of power does not violate the free speech provisions of the 
First Amendment.145 
5.   The FCC As Big Government:                                                              
The 1960 Program Policy Statement 
NBC came to stand for the proposition that since there was a limited 
amount of space on the spectrum, the government could restrict access to 
the spectrum based on its conception of which potential licensees would 
best serve the public interest.146  The FCC’s idea of the public interest 
during this period focused on providing programming designed to meet a 
variety of preferences found in the station’s local community.147  This 
could be characterized as a manifestation of the New Deal ideology that 
government should be actively involved in organizing aspects of social 
life that have widespread public effects.148 
The fullest development of this conception in regard to broadcasting is 
found in a 1960 FCC Program Policy Statement, which identified fourteen 
“major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest.”149  In 
 
 142. Id. at 224. 
 143. Id. at 198–209. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 226–27.  The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution asserts that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 146. NBC, 319 U.S. at 218. 
 147. See, e.g., Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946), 
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 132–216 (Frank. J. Kahn ed., 3d 
ed. 1978). 
 148. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to 
Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 448–49 (2001). 
 149. Network Programming Inquiry: Report and Statement of Policy, 25 Fed. Reg. 
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order to determine “the tastes, needs and desires of the community,” the 
FCC adopted “formal ascertainment requirements, which compelled 
applicants for broadcast licenses to detail the results of interviews conducted 
by the applicant with community ‘leaders’ in nineteen FCC specified 
categories ranging from agriculture to religion.”150  Although this kind of 
New Deal-style regulation made sense considering the FCC’s mandate 
to make sure the spectrum is used in ways that serve the public interest, 
it is not surprising that such regulation would draw the ire of 
philosophical critics of government regulation. 
C.  The Marketplace Approach to the Public Interest 
While the scarcity rationale undergirded the FCC’s regulatory regime 
for three decades, some academics pressed alternative, business-oriented 
approaches.151  Eventually, these views became part of the FCC’s 
broadcast licensing policies. 
1.  The Economist’s Constitutional Argument:                                            
The First Amendment and the Public Interest 
By the early 1960s, Ronald Coase and other economists were voicing 
a sustained critique of the FCC’s broadcast licensing practices, arguing 
that they were hindering the efficient, market-based use of scarce 
resources.152  The goal of Coase’s economic analysis is the conversion of 
license holders into property owners who will be free to use their 
property to seek economic advantage.  The argument, however, begins 
with an attack on FCC regulation as an infringement of the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters.153 
With the approval of the courts, the FCC insisted that their regulations 
did not restrict speech, but only access to the spectrum; once a 
broadcaster met the requirements and was issued a license, the FCC was 
 
7291, 7295 (July 29, 1960).  The fourteen public interest elements identified in the report 
are:  
(1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use of 
Local Talent, (3) Programs for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) 
Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorialization by 
Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10) News 
Programs, (11) Weather and Market Reports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service 
to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment Programming.   
Id. 
 150. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 2, at 616. 
 151. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 36, at 14. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 7–12; see also Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing 
Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990, 990–92 (1989) (critiquing government regulation 
of the spectrum as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech and proposing a 
private property system of spectrum ownership). 
MARTIN.DOC 3/3/2020  9:37 AM 
[VOL. 38:  1159, 2001] Public Interest and Low-Power Radio 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1179 
forbidden from practicing censorship by both the First Amendment and 
section 326 of the Communications Act.154  On the other hand, if a 
broadcaster conducted his station in ways that were against the public 
interest, he could lose his license.155  Is this a restriction on speech or a 
requirement for a privilege?  The FCC justified the difference between 
broadcast and print media by pointing to the inherent scarcity of 
spectrum; in the words of Justice Frankfurter: “the radio spectrum simply is 
not large enough to accommodate everybody.”156   
As the economists are quick to point out, scarcity is not a distinguishing 
feature of the electromagnetic spectrum: “[l]and, labor, and capital are 
all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call for government regulation.”157  
Advocates of an economic approach suggest that if spectrum regulation 
is correctly based on scarcity, “[a] Federal Paper Commission would 
then be necessary to decide how much paper would be available for 
(say) books and how much for (say) wallpaper.  The Commission would 
further choose who was permitted to engage in book publishing.”158 
This argument avoids the reality of the situation.  The point is not just 
that spectrum is scarce, but also that when it became apparent that 
spectrum was useful, the government, as the representative of civil society, 
claimed ownership.  In other words, spectrum is scarce, and within the 
United States it is owned by the government of the United States.159  
Advocates of marketplace regulation acknowledge this ownership when 
they call for government auctions of the right to use the spectrum.160  
Given that the government owns the resource, the allocation of the 
resource is properly a public policy decision. 
 
 154. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 103. 
 155. See, for example, the case of Dr. Brinkley discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
 156. NBC, 319 U.S. at 213. 
 157. Coase, supra note 36, at 14; see Spitzer, supra note 153, at 1013–14.  The 
same argument is made in KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 204, accompanied 
by an economistic revision of the English language: “A ‘nonscarce resource’ is a 
contradiction in terms.”  Id.  Nothing in the American Heritage Dictionary definition of 
“resource” indicates that scarcity is an inherent quality of resources.  See Resource, in 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1536 (3d ed. 1992). 
 158. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 18. 
 159. When this ownership was instituted, it was encouraged and accepted by the 
major commercial interests, which generally endorsed the basic idea promoted at 
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover’s Radio Conferences: the establishment of 
government order was required to control the station interference that would keep the 
medium from being profitable.  See id. at 8–10, 19; STREETER, supra note 38, at 88–89, 
246–47. 
 160. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 3, at 211–12. 
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The issue of whom to allow to use the publicly owned spectrum is 
fundamentally a question of programming practices, not infringements 
on freedom of speech.  Many of the cases in which broadcasters alleged 
that the FCC infringed upon their free speech rights were fairness 
doctrine cases.161  Basically, broadcasters claimed the freedom to keep 
other people off of the broadcasters’ signals.162  The argument was that if 
broadcasters have to let people on the air to respond to controversial 
opinions or even personal attacks, broadcasters would be reluctant to 
address controversial issues.  In other words, broadcasters would address 
controversial issues only if they were free to express certain views and 
exclude others.163  Thus, the fairness doctrine did not restrict speech; at 
most it restricted how much time could be given to one particular view 
to the detriment of a competing view.  Such restrictions on one-sided 
debate were directly tied to the fact that a license to broadcast is not a 
personal mouthpiece, the way a newspaper can be.164  A broadcaster can 
only acquire the privilege to use the public spectrum if he is willing to 
operate in the public interest as defined by the government as the 
representative of the public. 
This does not seem particularly difficult to understand or justify as a 
public policy.  Just as lessors can impose conditions on the use of their 
property by lessees, the public owners of the spectrum can require it be 
used in ways that are deemed advantageous to the public. 
The economists’ comparisons to other media can be turned around.  
Imagine that all the newsprint available in the United States could 
suddenly only be produced from certain trees grown on a mountain in 
Arizona that had been owned and managed by the government since 
taking the land from Mexico in 1846.  Newsprint would thus be a public 
resource.  A public policy is required to determine how to allocate the 
newsprint.  There are at least two distinct possibilities. 
First, the government could sell the newsprint to the highest bidder.  
This policy would directly serve the public interest by adding revenue to 
the treasury.  Economic analysts would also argue that there would be 
“social benefit” when the paper is put to its “highest valued” use.  In this 
sense, the “highest valued” use generally means that which is most 
 
 161. The FCC’s “fairness doctrine,” repealed in 1987, required radio and television 
licensees to (1) provide coverage of significant public issues and (2) ensure that the 
coverage accurately presents conflicting views on those issues.  KRATTENMAKER & 
POWE, supra note 3, at 239. 
 162. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 163. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392–95 (1969).  The 
First Amendment argument in Red Lion is discussed in KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra 
note 3, at 166. 
 164. See KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 
1931), discussed supra Part III.B.2. 
MARTIN.DOC 3/3/2020  9:37 AM 
[VOL. 38:  1159, 2001] Public Interest and Low-Power Radio 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1181 
profitable for the investors. 
Alternatively, the government could divide up the newsprint among all the 
members of the public who wanted to use some of this valuable public 
resource.  This policy would advance the public interest by allowing a 
fair say to all constituents.  Of course, this would leave very little 
newsprint for each person who wants to use it, so the policy could be 
altered so that the newsprint is given to applicants who are willing to use 
it in such a way that a wide spectrum of perspectives make it into print.  
In other words, a printer could use the public resource to seek a profit so 
long as some of the resource was used to advance the public policy goal 
of facilitating access to a wide range of opinions and ideas. 
These are both valid policies, and the decision which to implement 
should be a policy decision mediated by the political process.  Significantly, 
though, the advocates of an economic approach to spectrum use have 
sometimes sought to short circuit such a policy debate by arguing that 
the fair-say allocation of spectrum is unconstitutional because it violates 
the right to free speech.165  Thus, the field is purportedly left to the 
economic interpretation.  A skeptical reader might see this argument as 
an attempt to remove the public (as reflected in an elected government) 
from a meaningful say in how public resources are used.  The insistence 
that the use of a particular (or every) public resource should be 
determined by how much profit private investors can reap may be a 
plausible political perspective—a policy to seek to implement through 
political mobilization—but to insist that some natural or constitutional 
logic impels application of the “price mechanism” to public resources is 
antidemocratic polemic. 
To summarize, the First Amendment argument against FCC regulation 
of broadcast licenses misconstrued the policy goal of ensuring a 
diversity of perspectives as a restriction on broadcaster’s right to speak 
freely.  A more appropriate approach would have been to make the 
policy argument that a marketplace system of regulation is in the public 
interest.  Eventually, as described in the case of WNCN Listeners Guild 
discussed below,166 that was exactly the view the FCC adopted. 
 
 165. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 36, at 7–12. 
 166. See infra Part III.3. 
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2.  A Court’s View of the First Amendment and the Public Interest: 
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 1989 
The FCC decisions and court cases concerning television station 
WTVH brought all these issues into play and ultimately determined that 
the regulatory scheme was a matter of policy and not, at least as 
presented by the FCC, a constitutional question.167  What became 
the Syracuse Peace Council litigation started with a ruling that station 
WTVH in Syracuse, New York, had violated the fairness doctrine when 
it broadcast editorial advertisements advocating the construction of a 
nuclear plant as a sound investment.168  Since this was “a controversial 
issue of public importance,” the FCC ruled that the fairness doctrine 
required that the station air contrasting viewpoints.169  In the administrative 
proceeding, the Meredith Corporation, parent of WTVH, argued that the 
fairness doctrine violated its right to free speech.170  But the FCC refused 
to consider this argument based on a 1985 internal study that determined 
that, while the fairness doctrine may violate the First Amendment by 
“chilling” broadcasters’ speech, the constitutional issues were best left to 
Congress and the courts.171   
Meredith appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled 
that the FCC’s avoidance of the constitutional issues raised by Meredith 
was improper and remanded the issue for reconsideration.172  On 
remand, the plaintiff, Syracuse Peace Council, sought to preempt the 
hearing of the constitutional issues because WTVH had since met the 
requirements of the fairness doctrine by airing contrasting views on the 
wisdom of constructing the power plant.173  But the FCC, which had 
been inviting the courts and Congress to rule against the fairness doctrine, 
refused to dismiss the issue, citing the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that the 
FCC had erred in avoiding the constitutional issue.174 
This time around, the FCC, under the leadership of Reagan appointee 
and marketplace regulation advocate Mark Fowler, not only ruled that 
the fairness doctrine violated the First Amendment, it also determined 
that the fairness doctrine disserved the public interest, and then took the 
opportunity to repudiate the scarcity justification of government spectrum 
 
 167. See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Syracuse 
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Complaint of Syracuse 
Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5043 (1987). 
 168. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5034, 5044 (1987). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 5043–44. 
 172. Id. at 5044–45. 
 173. Id. at 5045. 
 174. Id. at 5046. 
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regulation.175 
Eventually, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s ruling, but on narrow 
grounds that did not reach either the First Amendment argument or the 
rejection of the scarcity rationale.176  Since the FCC determined that 
application of the fairness doctrine was not in the public interest, as it 
had discretion to do, it was not required to implement it.177  The court in 
effect ruled that the FCC was required to regulate in the public interest, 
but left the determination of what constituted the public interest up to the 
agency and the political processes underlying it.  In this way, the court 
concurred in the argument that the system of programming regulation is 
a policy question, not a constitutional one. 
This new idea of the public interest advanced by the FCC in Syracuse 
Peace Council is not wholly distinct from its constitutional argument 
but, as the court noted,178 the argument basically followed the public 
interest argument contained in the FCC’s Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of 
the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the General 
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees.179  There, the 
FCC found that the fairness doctrine, “as a matter of policy, disserves 
the public interest.”180 
In both the Fairness Doctrine report and Syracuse Peace Council, the 
FCC started by denying that the scarcity rationale remained apt in the 
context of broadcasting: “The Commission found in recent years that 
there had been an explosive growth in both the number and types of 
outlets providing information to the public.  Hence, the Supreme Court’s 
apparent concern that listeners and viewers have access to diverse 
sources of information has now been allayed.”181  This appears to be a 
misguided argument, however.  The basis of programming regulation is 
that there is not enough spectrum for everyone who would like access to 
it.  The addition of hundreds of cable channels or thousands of Internet 
sites does not change the fact that there is only so much spectrum 
available and consequently some would-be broadcasters must be kept 
 
 175. Id. at 5047–48. 
 176. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 177. Id.; see also Logan, supra note 63, at 1703 & n.92. 
 178. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 656. 
 179. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations 
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 
F.C.C.2d 143 (1986) [hereinafter Fairness Doctrine Report]. 
 180. Id. at 148. 
 181. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5053 (1987). 
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off; this is the source of the need for regulation. 
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit Court ignored the FCC’s argument that 
scarcity is no longer an issue.  Instead, the court focused on the FCC’s 
assertion that: “In sum, the fairness doctrine in operation disserves both 
the public’s right to diverse sources of information and the broadcaster’s 
interest in free expression.  Its chilling effect thwarts its intended 
purpose, and it results in excessive and unnecessary government 
intervention into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists.”182  By 
basing its decision to abandon the fairness doctrine on its interpretation 
of the public interest, “the Commission is exercising both its 
Congressionally-delegated power and its expertise; it clearly enjoys 
broad deference on issues of both fact and policy.”183  This is as far as 
the court would allow itself to go: “it is an elementary canon that 
American courts are not to ‘pass upon a constitutional question . . . if 
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of.’”184  In other words, since the FCC made a reasoned policy 
decision as to what constitutes the public interest, there was no need to 
address any constitutional issue.185 
The decision in Syracuse Peace Council is squarely in the tradition of 
court opinions regarding the FCC’s programming regulations schemes: 
so long as it is based on a reasonable argument, the FCC is free to 
construe the public interest as it sees fit.  This makes sense.  The public 
interest should be determined by public policy, and when new 
administrations are elected, they should be able to implement their 
conception of such policies, so long as they do not inhibit future 
administrations from doing the same. 
3.  The Entertainment Marketplace as the Public Interest:                      
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 1981 
In fact, the FCC had been promoting market regulation as the public 
interest for several years before the Syracuse Peace Council litigation 
raised any constitutional issues.  This policy was vetted by the Supreme 
Court in FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, in which citizens groups 
challenged the FCC’s authority to approve radio stations’ format changes 
 
 182. Id. at 5052. 
 183. Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 658. 
 184. Id. at 657 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 185. One can feel some sympathy for the FCC: first the court admonishes the 
Commission not to ignore the Meredith Corporation’s constitutional arguments, then it 
says that such consideration was unnecessary.  But this reversal only came about because 
the FCC reversed itself with regard to the WTVH issue and included a public policy 
determination along with its constitutional analysis. 
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without a hearing.186 
In 1976, the FCC issued a policy statement that found that requiring a 
review hearing for every license renewal involving a station that changes 
format against the wishes of some listeners was not in the public 
interest.187  The Commission asserted that the task of deciding whether a 
particular format change did or did not serve the public was too difficult,188 
and that such review “inevitably deprives the public of the best efforts of 
the broadcast industry.”189  The policy statement further asserted that 
“the marketplace is the best way to allocate entertainment formats in 
radio.”190  The Commission: 
recognize[d] that the market for radio advertisers is not a completely faithful 
mirror of the listening preferences of the public at large.  But we are not 
required to measure any system of allocation against the standard of perfection; 
we find on the basis of the record before us that [format allocation by market 
forces] is the best available means of producing the diversity to which the 
public is entitled.191 
Strangely, a few paragraphs later, the Commission disputed the idea 
that diversity should be the goal of policy, citing a professor who “has 
demonstrated that maximization of format diversity will not necessarily 
lead to increased listener satisfaction.”192  In any case, the FCC had 
 
 186. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585–86 (1981). 
 187. In re Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of 
Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976) (policy statement), reconsideration denied, 
66 F.C.C.2d 78 (1977). 
 188. Id. at 862–64. 
 189. Id. at 865. 
 190. Id. at 863. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 864.  Exactly how the professor, Bruce Owen of Stanford University, 
“demonstrated” this assertion is not clear from the text of the policy statement, but the 
FCC accepted his argument as “clearly point[ing] to the conclusion” that the public 
interest is not served by reviewing format changes: 
Professor Owen shows that efforts to maximize format diversity through 
regulatory fiat could very well result in a diminution of consumer welfare: a 
format protected under the WEFM rationale [that format changes that leave a 
community without a particular entertainment format require an FCC hearing 
if there is a significant amount of public protest against the change] may be of 
lesser value than the format which the broadcaster proposes to substitute.  
There is no way to determine the relative values of two different types of 
programming in the abstract.  This is a practical, empirical question, whose 
answer turns on the intensity of demand for each format.  It is impossible to 
determine whether consumers would be better off with an entirely new format 
without reference to the actual preferences of real people.  In these 
circumstances, there is no reason to believe that government mandated 
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begun interpreting the public interest in entertainment formats as best 
achieved by allocation through market forces.  According to this view, if 
the people licensed to broadcast on the electromagnetic spectrum were 
allowed to use that privilege to maximize profits, the public would get 
what they want—the “public interest.”193 
A coalition of citizen groups petitioned the court of appeals for review 
of the new policy,194 and an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit sided with 
the petitioners, ruling that the no-review policy was contrary to the 
Communications Act and the court’s earlier decisions.195 
But the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that: 
[D]iversity is not the only policy the Commission must consider in fulfilling its 
responsibilities under the Act.  The Commission’s implementation of the 
public-interest standard, when based on a rational weighing of competing 
policies, is not to be set aside by the Court of Appeals . . . . The Commission’s 
position on review of format changes reflects a reasonable accommodation of 
the policy of promoting diversity in programming and the policy of avoiding 
unnecessary restrictions on licensee discretion.196 
The Court seemed to stop short of the Commission’s faith in the market, 
but it found a balancing of public and private interests that resulted in 
the same policy.  Ultimately, the Court did find that using the market to 
allocate entertainment formats was an arguably reasonable approach to 
promoting the public interest; therefore, the court of appeals had 
 
restrictions on format changes would promote the welfare of the listening 
public.  Indeed, in view of the administrative costs involved in such a program 
of regulation, and in view of the chilling effect such regulations would 
doubtlessly have on program innovation, there is every reason to believe that 
government supervision of formats would be injurious to the public interest.  
The record in this proceeding clearly points to the conclusion that such a 
program of regulation would not be compatible with our statutory duty to 
promote the public convenience, interest and necessity, and we so find. 
Id.  Part of the problem with this “demonstration” is the fact that, under the WEFM 
rationale, the hearing requirement is only triggered if some listeners have protested a 
proposed format change, protests that obviously qualify as an “empirical” expression of 
“the actual preferences of real people.”  Id.  Perhaps a larger number of listeners prefer 
format B (e.g., rock and roll) to format A (e.g., classical), but if other stations are already 
broadcasting format B, the addition of another rock station and the elimination of the 
only classical station will not significantly increase listener satisfaction with the 
available format choices.  However, a switch to a more popular format probably will 
enable a station owner to charge more for advertising. 
 193. Id. at 863–64. 
 194. Petitioners included the Office of Communications of the United Church of 
Christ, the Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia, the WNCN 
Listeners Guild, and Classical Music Supporters, Inc.  See In re Development of Policy 
Re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 66 F.C.C.2d 78, 78 n.1 
(1977). 
 195. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev’d, 
450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
 196. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). 
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overstepped its authority in denying the FCC discretion to implement the 
policy.197 
As probusiness administrations and Congresses during the 1980s and 
1990s emphasized marketplace regulation of broadcast licenses, resulting in 
passage of the 1996 Telecommunications (Telecom) Act, the industry 
has been significantly transformed.198  The most notable change has been 
in the area of station ownership requirements.  Ultimately, the Telecom 
Act removed restrictions on national ownership and relaxed restrictions 
on local ownership; now one owner can own up to half of the radio 
stations in a particular community.199  A commentator summarized these 
trends: 
Beginning in 1985, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed 
radio ownership limits to increase competition and diversity in the radio 
industry.  These effects have been even more dramatic with the Telecom Act, 
where the radio industry has experienced tremendous consolidation and the 
number of radio station owners has dropped significantly.  The number of radio 
station owners has declined 11.7%; whereas the number of radio outlets has 
dropped 2.5%. 200 
Thus, whatever the intent of the legislators, the increasing consolidation 
or centralization of radio station ownership has had at least two notable 
effects: “less localism and diminished diversity.”201  In other words, the 
radio signals currently broadcast within a particular community are less 
a reflection or expression of that specific community and more a 
loudspeaker of a national corporate culture.202  This is a foreseeable 
effect of the marketplace regulation that Congress and the FCC came to 
define as the public interest. 
 
 197. Id. at 603–04. 
 198. See Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, Comment, The Game of Radiopoly: An Antitrust 
Perspective of Consolidation in the Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 474 (2000). 
 199. See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 69 (1999). 
 200. Leeper, supra note 198, at 475–76. 
 201. Fofana, supra note 6, at 410. 
 202. This is exactly the kind of development that conservatives in the original sense 
of the word would deplore; many people who call themselves conservatives today seem 
driven more by a zealous faith in “the market” than by a concern with maintaining 
traditional values and communities.  See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, When Free Markets 
Threaten Family Values, BUS. WK., May 17, 1999, at 23 (“Free markets, taken to an 
extreme, can be unhealthy for traditional values.”). 
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D.  Low-Power FM Service and the Public Interest 
In the midst of the media mergers that have come to encompass radio 
broadcasting over the last fifteen years, popular dissent arose in the form 
of low-power “pirate” or “micro” radio stations.203  Legend has the 
modern low-power radio movement beginning in 1987 in the John Hay 
Homes housing project in Springfield, Illinois, when Mbanna Kantako 
began broadcasting Black Liberation Radio.204  Like Black Liberation 
Radio, low-power stations were usually started by people who felt their 
interests, perspectives, and tastes were not represented by the available 
broadcast media; most low-power stations broadcast some combination 
of community news, commentary, or entertainment programming.205 
When a low-power station came to the FCC’s attention, inspectors 
would seek to locate the station and shut it down; enforcement actions 
included cease and desist orders, administrative hearings, forfeitures of 
equipment and money, and sometimes court proceedings.206  In 1993, the 
FCC sought a forfeiture from microradio activist Stephen Dunifer and 
his station Free Radio Berkeley.207  With the help of members of the 
National Lawyers Guild’s Committee for Democratic Communications, 
 
 203. See Brief for Mbanna Kantako, at 1–6, available at http://www.alankorn.com/ 
briefs/microradio_mbanna.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) (brief not filed).  See 
generally Fofana, supra note 6, at 416 (describing the appropriateness of low-power 
radio as a way to bring diverse voices to radio broadcasting); Leeper, supra note 198, at 
474 (explaining “[t]he mass consolidation of the radio industry [as] a result of two recent 
developments: the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . and the use of 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines by federal antitrust enforcement agencies”).  
 204. See Brief for Mbanna Kantako, supra note 203, at 1–6.  According to the brief: 
Until Kantako’s station went on the air, no Black owned or Black run stations 
existed in Springfield.  As a result, WTRA/Black Liberation Radio began 
broadcasting community information and music unavailable anywhere else in 
Springfield.  In a given week, Kantako broadcasts the voices of anywhere from 
20 to 50 persons from the community.  This programming has included 
interviews with authors, scholars and activists around the country concerned 
about black genocide; lots of politically conscious rap and reggae music (no 
sexist or materialistic stuff); discussions and commentary (from a critical 
perspective) on local and national events effecting the Black community; 
interviews with victims of police misconduct and abuse; criticism of the 
NAACP and Urban League for being co-opted and irrelevant to current 
conditions in Black America; anti-drug messages recognizing the drug plague 
as a method of social control of Black men; severe criticism of U.S. 
domination of people of color around the world; rebroadcasting of speeches by 
Malcolm X, Minister Louis Farrakhan, Stokley Carmichael, Huey Newton, 
Angela Davis, and other Black activists. 
Id. 
 205. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4; see also Fofana, supra note 6, at 
409. 
 206. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, §§ 47–48, 57–60. 
 207. United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 
RUGGIERO, supra note 5, at 24–27. 
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Dunifer argued that he was practicing free speech using the public 
airwaves, and that the FCC’s broadcast licensing scheme was 
unconstitutional.208  When the FCC rejected Dunifer’s constitutional, 
statutory, and evidentiary arguments against the forfeiture, Dunifer filed 
an Application for Review of the Forfeiture with the FCC.209  Rather 
than consider these arguments in its own administrative proceeding, the 
FCC filed suit seeking to enjoin Dunifer from engaging in unlicensed radio 
broadcasting.210 
Now, as a defendant in federal court, Dunifer again pressed his 
constitutional challenge to the FCC’s right to keep noninterfering signals 
off of the broadcast spectrum.  Eventually, after a journey back to the 
FCC, then back to the northern district of California, then finally to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Dunifer’s argument was dismissed on 
procedural grounds: the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
constitutionality of FCC licensing regulations until the defendant had 
exhausted internal FCC procedures, including applying for a license to 
broadcast.211 
When Dunifer’s defensive argument was dismissed and Free Radio 
Berkeley was enjoined from further broadcasts, low-power broadcasters 
in New York City filed a suit against Attorney General Janet Reno and 
the FCC, again asserting a constitutional right to broadcast non-
interfering radio signals.212  Specifically, the plaintiffs 
claim[ed] a First Amendment right to speak over the electromagnetic spectrum 
dedicated to radio broadcasting—an electronic public forum of virtually 
unlimited character—subject only to reasonable time, place and manner 
regulations that are even-handedly applied to all broadcasters, full-power and 
low-power alike.  Plaintiffs maintain that the present regulatory scheme for 
radio broadcasting, . . . on its face and as applied to microradio stations, violates 
their right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.213 
In effect, the Free Speech plaintiffs were arguing that the FCC could 
not allow some broadcasters access to the spectrum, while denying 
access to others who were not interfering with anyone else.  Notably, 
 
 208. See Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, §§ 84–99, for a similar argument. 
 209. Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1005. 
 210. Id. at 1005. 
 211. Id. at 1008.  See Michael J. Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in the 
Return to Localism, Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 
1133, 1155–56 (1999). 
 212. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, at introduction. 
 213. Id. 
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this argument is distinct from the free speech arguments advanced by the 
marketplace regulation advocates and to some extent adopted by the 
FCC.214  Those arguments focused on the “restrictive” requirement that 
broadcasters provide access to the spectrum for people with contrasting 
viewpoints on controversial issues.215  The Free Speech plaintiffs, on the 
other hand, were arguing that the current regulatory regime: 
authorizes the FCC to grant broadcast licenses to use exclusively assigned 
frequencies (either in a given region or on a nationwide basis) to a relatively 
few broadcast radio stations which are collectively owned by even fewer media 
companies, thus effectively allowing a select group of favored speakers to 
monopolize and therefore limit speech in the electronic public forum dedicated 
to radio broadcasting[.]216 
The Free Speech plaintiffs’ complaint hinged on the argument that the 
broadcast spectrum constitutes a “public forum,” a contention supported 
by the comments of then-FCC Chairman William Kennard.217  If the 
spectrum is a public forum, allowing access to a privileged few would 
violate the First Amendment. However, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit agreed, that the FCC’s allocation of space on the broadcast 
spectrum was not subject to public forum analysis.218  Ironically, the 
second circuit decision cited the 1943 NBC decision for the proposition 
that “radio has ‘unique characteristic[s]’ that prevent its being made 
available to all who might seek to broadcast, [and therefore] the ‘right of 
free speech does not include . . . the right to use the facilities of radio 
without a license.’”219  Thus, the scarcity rationale the FCC had rejected 
in its pursuit of a marketplace conception of the public interest reappears 
to justify the FCC’s restrictions against noninterfering, low-power 
broadcasters. 
Ironically, before the courts of appeals decided Free Speech and 
Dunifer, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for licensing 
low-power stations.220  In January 2000, following a public comments 
period, the FCC announced the structure of a new low-power FM 
(LPFM) service and set up a schedule for receiving applications from 
potential broadcasters.221 
In the Proposed Rule Making in re Creation of Low-power radio 
 
 214. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 215. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 3, at 237–75; see also In re 
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5043–44. 
 216. Free Speech Complaint, supra note 4, at introduction. 
 217. See id. § 36. 
 218. Free Speech v. Reno, 200 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Proposed Rule Making, supra note 9, at 2471. 
 221. FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2205. 
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Service, the FCC stated that, “our goals are to address unmet needs for 
community-oriented radio broadcasting, foster opportunities for new 
radio broadcast ownership, and promote additional diversity in radio 
voices and program services.”222  The FCC expressed the hope that a 
new low-power radio service would “provide new entrants the ability to 
add their voices to the existing mix of political, social, and entertainment 
programming, and could address special interests shared by residents of 
geographically compact areas.”223  In effect, the FCC was acknowledging 
that the consolidation of radio station ownership that followed from the 
institution of the marketplace conception of the public interest was not 
meeting the needs of all communities and was not fostering sufficient 
diversity in the “voices” on radio.224 
The following year, when the rules for the new service were announced, 
the Commission stated its belief that: 
[T]he LPFM service authorized in this proceeding will provide opportunities for 
new voices to be heard and will ensure that we fulfill our statutory obligation to 
authorize facilities in a manner that best serves the public interest. . . .  Our goal 
in creating a new LPFM service is to create a class of radio stations designed to 
serve very localized communities or underrepresented groups.225 
Throughout the nontechnical portion of the report, public interest 
goals are emphasized.  The LPFM service is designed to “focus[] on 
local needs;”226 “encourag[e] diverse voices on the nation’s airwaves and 
creat[e] opportunities for new entrants in broadcasting;”227 “allow local 
groups, including schools, churches and other community-based 
organizations, to provide programming responsive to local community 
needs and interests;”228 “foster a program service responsive to the needs 
and interests of small local community groups, particularly specialized 
community needs that have not been well served by commercial 
 
 222. Proposed Rule Making, supra note 9, at 2471. 
 223. Id. at 2476. 
 224. Id. at 2476, 2534(a) (Joint Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard and 
Commissioner Gloria Tristani); see also Fofana, supra note 6, at 415–16.  The New York 
Times reported that, “William E. Kennard, the F.C.C. chairman, has said that adding 
hundreds of low-power radio stations is one of his top priorities—a key way to 
counteract the increasing consolidation of the industry into the hands of a relatively few 
big profit-minded broadcasters.”  David Leonhardt, Religious Groups at Odds with 
G.O.P. on Radio Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at A1. 
 225. FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2206. 
 226. Id. at 2210. 
 227. Id. at 2212. 
 228. Id. at 2213. 
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broadcast stations;”229 and “assign licenses . . . in a manner that is most 
likely to place them in the hands of local community groups that are in 
the best position to serve local community needs.”230 
In pursuit of these goals, the LPFM service was set up as a noncommercial 
educational service.231  The report concluded that the need for local 
service is best filled by noncommerical broadcasters: “[c]ommerical 
broadcast stations, by their very nature, have commercial incentives to 
maximize audience size in order to improve their ratings and thereby 
increase their advertising revenues.  We are concerned that these 
commercial incentives could frustrate achievement of our goal in 
establishing this service.”232  The FCC also promulgated rules restricting 
ownership of LPFM stations.  “In order to further our diversity goals and 
foster local, community-based service, we will not allow any broadcaster 
or other media entity subject to our ownership rules to control or to hold 
an attributable ownership interest in an LPFM station . . . .”233 
Having found locally based, community-oriented programming comprising 
a variety of voices to be an aspect of the public interest, the FCC has 
determined that that aspect of the public interest is not served by the 
marketplace regulation of the broadcast spectrum.  In order to ensure 
that local communities have a place on the airwaves, the government 
must carve out small zones of nonprofit territory.  The Commission 
seems to conclude that the local diversity aspect of the public interest runs 
contrary to the “very nature” of commercial stations,234 while being inherent 
in a low-power, noncommercial educational service.  Thus, since LPFM 
stations inherently promote the public interest, operators are not required to 
meet the same public interest requirements as commercial broadcasters. 
Every broadcast licensee is required to operate its station in the public interest.  
Given the nature of the LPFM service, however, we conclude that certain 
obligations imposed on full-power radio licensees would be unnecessary if 
applied to LPFM licensees.  We expect that the local nature of this service, 
coupled with the eligibility and selection criteria we are adopting, will ensure 
that LPFM licensees will meet the needs and interests of their communities.  
Thus, . . . we will not adopt a rule requiring LPFM licensees to provide 
programming responsive to community issues or to maintain a list of issues 
addressed or specific programs aired.235 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at 2215–16. 
 234. Id. at 2213. 
 235. Id. at 2270.  However, like all broadcasters, LFPM operators will be required 
to follow the Political Programming Rules and “allow legally qualified candidates for 
federal office reasonable access to their facilities, but because LPFM stations are 
noncommercial educational facilities, they must provide such access on a free basis.”  Id. 
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Whether LPFM stations fulfill the FCC’s faith in their inherent ability 
to serve local communities with diverse voices remains to be seen.236  
What is clear is that the FCC has carved out an explicit “local” aspect of 
the public interest within the currently dominant marketplace conception.  
The broadcast industry’s intense resistance to and lobbying against the 
new LPFM service suggests that the incoherence of these two public 




 236. The New York Times estimates that of the approximately 750 applicants for 
LPFM licenses in the first ten states from which applications were accepted, 47% were 
churches and other religious groups, while 18% came from community groups.  
Leonhardt, supra note 224, at C8.  Perhaps perceiving a competitive threat, the National 
Religious Broadcasters Association joined the National Association of Broadcasters 
(NAB) and National Public Radio (NPR) in opposing LPFM.  Leonhardt, supra note 
224, at C8.  One LPFM applicant, Sanford Kravette, pastor of the Christian Fellowship 
of New England, in Center Conway, N.H., told the Boston Globe that he would like to 
use an LPFM license “to read the Gospel of John, verse by verse, and then help people 
relate it to everyday life.”  D.C. Denison, Public Radio, FM Upstarts Tangling over 
Licenses: Low-Power Outlets Say Issue Is Competition, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, 
at C1.  Pastor Kravette’s idea may be a legitimate use of public spectrum, but if the 
Center Conway area, like many in the United States, already gets New Testament-
oriented programming from one or more existing full-power stations, then granting an 
LPFM license to the Christian Fellowship of New England is probably not the best way 
to add diversity to the voices on the local airwaves.  If there is no New Testament 
programming in the area, Pastor Kravette would be an ideal LPFM licensee. 
 237. Not surprisingly, the commercial broadcasters have reversed course and 
returned to their 1920s evocation of the interference-scarcity rationale to protect their 
control of the spectrum and resist the possibility of less regulated, locally based 
competition.  In an attempt to derail the LPFM service, the NAB not only lobbied 
Congress, but also filed suit in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  In its brief for the 
court, the NAB made three arguments: 
First, when the FCC adopted the LPFM rules, it reversed its long-standing 
policy that low-power services are an inefficient use of spectrum, and it 
provided no explanation of that reversal.  Second, according to NAB, the 
commission disregarded evidence showing that the implementation of LPFM 
would cause substantial interference to existing FM service.  Third, the 
commission has insisted that the benefits of LPFM would outweigh any costs, 
but it has failed to undertake a proper cost/benefit analysis. 
Harry Martin, FCC Update: NAB Files Brief on LPFM Issues, BE RADIO, Sept. 30, 
2000, 2000 WL 7260614.  For a plea that the NAB drop their opposition to LPFM, see 
William E. Kennard, Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters (Apr. 11, 
2000), 2000 WL 369665 (F.C.C.). 
In the 2000 Congress, Senator Gregg of New Hampshire introduced Senate Bill 2068, 
the “Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act,” which would have completely banned a low-
power service; Senator Grams of Minnesota offered Senate Bill 3020, a “reasonable 
compromise” measure cheered by the NAB and NPR, which would allow a severely 
curtailed LPFM.  Bill to Cut Back LPFM Introduced in Senate, PUB. BROADCASTING 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The broadcast spectrum is a public resource that is to be administered 
and used in the public interest.  The public nature of this valuable 
resource calls for policy and decision making that is as close as possible 
to the democratic processes that reflects the will of the public.  For this 
reason, the role of the judiciary is appropriately limited.  Courts have 
properly refrained from interposing specific ideas of the public interest 
when called upon to render decisions regarding FCC policies.  
The public interest should be defined through public policy determinations 
vetted through political processes that are subject to democratic controls.  
Courts should continue to find ways to let the FCC operate without the 
imposition of specific meanings on the idea of the public interest.  That 
being said, there is one way the courts should be prepared to put an 
appropriate brake on the FCC’s power to define the public interest: 
courts should take a long-term view and protect public resources for 
future generations that have no power over legislators in the present.  In 
other words, if the FCC decided it was in the public interest to sell 
 
REP., Sept. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8774518 [hereinafter Bill to Cut Back 
LPFM]; see Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, S. 2068, 106th Cong. (2000), 
WL 1999 CONG US S 2068; Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, S. 3020, 
106th Cong. (2000), WL 1999 CONG US S 3020.  In December 2000, the language of 
Senate Bill 3020 was “included virtually word-for-word” in a budget bill for the 
Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary.  LPFM Rollback Included 
in Commerce-Justice Bill, PUB. BROADCASTING REP., Nov. 3, 2000, available at 2000 
WL 8774551 [hereinafter LPFM Rollback]; Press Release, The White House, Statement 
by the President (Dec. 27, 2000), LEXIS-NEXIS, News Group File, All [hereinafter 
Statement by the President].  President Clinton reluctantly signed the bill into law, 
writing that: 
[T]his bill greatly restricts low-power FM radio broadcast.  Low-power radio 
stations are an important tool in fostering diversity on the airwaves through 
community-based programming.  I am deeply disappointed that Congress 
chose to restrict the voice of our nation’s churches, schools, civic organizations 
and community groups.  I commend the FCC for giving a voice to the 
voiceless and I urge the Commission to go forward in licensing as many 
stations as possible consistent with the limitations imposed by Congress. 
Statement by the President, supra. 
The limitations imposed by Congress included restricting LPFM stations from 
frequencies within third adjacent channel separation from incumbent broadcasters.  See 
Bill to Cut Back LPFM, supra; LPFM Rollback, supra.  After detailed study and 
analysis, the FCC intended to restrict LPFM stations from second adjacent channels of 
existing stations.  See FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2235–46.  The budget 
bill’s restriction of third adjacent channels has the effect of limiting LPFM stations to the 
least populated parts of the country and has resulted in the FCC issuing half as many 
licenses as originally intended to applicants from the first twenty states from which 
applications were accepted.  See Kevin Diaz, Low-Power FM Radio Stations Dealt Blow 
in Congress’ Budget: Modest Plan Ran Into Major Static, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, 
Minn.), Dec. 22, 2000, at A15; Stephen Labaton, 255 Licenses Are Awarded for Low-
Power FM Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at C5. 
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permanent property rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, courts 
should intervene to forestall the deprivation of the opportunity to use 
irreplaceable public resources to later “publics” in ways that they determine to 
be in their interest. 
So long as there is not enough spectrum to allow everyone who so 
desires to broadcast a signal, broadcast spectrum is scarce.  The FCC 
should not use its discretion to do away with the scarcity rationale.  
Pointing to the proliferation of cable television channels and Internet 
websites is not a legitimate argument for lessening the public interest 
standards in broadcast licensing.  The scarcity of space on the spectrum 
should continue to play a central role in determining the public interest 
in broadcast licenses. 
Congress is the institution designed to reflect the will of the national 
public most directly.  The advocates of LPFM should be certain that 
members of Congress understand the FCC’s rationale for an LPFM 
service, specifically that the public interest in the broadcast spectrum 
includes the facilitation and availability of diverse local voices and 
perspectives.  Advocates should encourage members of Congress to 
show resolve in the face of the resistance to an LPFM service being 
exerted by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and National 
Public Radio.   
Unfortunately, members of Congress have shown a willingness to 
serve as the transmitters of the incumbent broadcasters’ distortions of the 
reality of LPFM.238  Rather than defer to the technical expertise of the 
FCC’s engineering studies,239 which determined that second adjacent 
channel protection was sufficient to protect the signals of existing 
broadcasters, Congress passed a year-end budget bill that adopted the 
NAB’s position that current broadcast stations required third adjacent 
channel protection (a bigger cluster of competition-free frequencies) and 
that more study was needed before LPFM stations could be licensed in 
 
 238. See Bill to Cut Back LPFM, supra note 237. 
 239. See FCC’s Low-Power Service, supra note 9, at 2235–46.  The FCC’s study 
included an analysis of the interference study submitted by the NAB and concluded that 
the signal to noise ratio criteria employed in the NAB study were not appropriate and 
were based on a level of noninterference higher than currently required for full-power 
broadcasters.  Id. at 2243.  In addition, the NAB tests included more of the lowest quality 
radio receivers than other studies.  Id. at 2246.  Even accepting the NAB’s worst-case 
scenario assumptions, the FCC found that “the area where such [lowest-quality] 
receivers could potentially experience degradation from interference is small, generally 1 
km or less from an LPFM antenna site.”  Id. at 2245. 
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third adjacent channels.240  This effectively cut in half the number of 
available LPFM licenses.241  Perhaps it is not surprising that members of 
Congress would side with a powerful trade association representing the 
interests of big media corporations over the interests of the many diverse 
applicants for LPFM licenses.242  So long as members of Congress must 
rely on private contributions to finance election campaigns, interests 
with money to donate have the upper hand over more popular, less-
moneyed constituencies.  The battle over the third adjacent channels 
could be a proving ground for the power of a grassroots movement to 
force corporate interests to accept the public’s right to access public 
resources as producers rather than as consumers. 
Those members of Congress who believe that the public interest in the 
broadcast spectrum includes the availability of diverse, local perspectives 
should consider requiring the FCC to recognize spectrum scarcity as a 
relevant factor in determining the public interest in broadcast licenses.  
More broadly, Congress members should actively solicit the opinions of 
their constituents regarding use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  What 
value do constituents place on using the spectrum: mass media driven by 
the entertainment marketplace; a public forum of local voices and 
participation; some combination of both; or something else altogether?  
In other words, how would an informed public want to use this public 





 240. LPFM Rollback, supra note 237. 
 241. See Labaton, supra note 237, at C5; Diaz, supra note 237, at A15.  Proceeding 
under Congress’s restrictions, the FCC had issued one hundred construction permits for 
LPFM stations as of August 2001; as many as five hundred more may be issued around 
the country.  See Bill McConnell, FCC’s Sound Choice: Streamlining Procedures Is 
Priority for New Radio Chief, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 13, 2001, at 42.  Given the 
one to three mile radius of an LPFM signal and Congress’s exclusion of stations from 
urban areas, these six hundred LPFM stations will reach a tiny percentage of the public. 
 242. In introducing legislation that would reverse the budget language restricting 
LPFM, Senator John McCain noted that during the previous Congress, “special interest 
forces opposed to low-power FM radio, most notably the National Association of 
Broadcasters and National Public Radio, mounted a successful behind-the-scenes 
campaign to kill low-power FM radio without a single debate on the Senate floor.”  Press 
Release, Senator John McCain, McCain Introduces Low-power radio Bill (Feb. 27, 
2001), LEXIS-NEXIS, News Group File, All. 
